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The president is the most influential policy actor in US politics, and his legislative
program greatly influences Congress’s agenda. Yet little research has focused on what
factors affect the president’s choices when constructing his agenda. We develop a theory
that determines when a president will include an issue in his program. We hypothesize
that presidents structure their agendas around the congressional calendar for considera-
tion of expiring laws and salient issues. Using data over 28 years and across 12 policy
areas, we find presidents build their programs around these policymaking opportunities.
We assert that presidential agendas are less driven by individual priorities than previous
accounts have concluded.
Introduction
In his first public comments after the 2012 election, Speaker John
Boehner told reporters he expected “the president to lead” on legislative
issues including the fiscal cliff, taxation, and immigration (Condon
2012). Others noted the unrealistic expectations this created since
presidents have tremendous difficulty “[advancing] a coherent agenda”
in divided government (Lizza 2013). While most legislative analysis
focuses on what legislation the president can get passed, these discus-
sions allude to an equally important aspect of the lawmaking process—
the items that make it onto the president’s policy agenda.
The president’s legislative program,1 which is the set of proposals
sent from the president to the legislative branch, is viewed as pivotal in
presidential-congressional relations. We see evidence of the privileged
place these requests have in three ways. First, they shape Congress’s
lawmaking agenda. Over 70% of the president’s issue priorities get
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congressional consideration, and significant legislation sent by the
administration is almost always debated (Edwards and Barrett 2000;
Peterson 1990). Second, these policy proposals are traditionally viewed
as a tool the president can use to open policy windows and create more
accommodating lawmaking environments. Kingdon reports that “no other
single actor in the political system has quite the capability of the president
to set agendas in given policy areas. . .” (1984, 23). Third, these proposals
provide cues to legislators about which issues they can successfully politi-
cize by opposing or supporting the president’s policy ideas (Lee 2009).
As the president’s program heavily influences legislative attention
and the level of partisanship within Congress, it is also crucial to under-
standing the broader policymaking process. To that end, we examine
why presidents select some issues to promote in their legislative agenda
and not others.
When deciding what issues to prioritize, presidents must balance
their desire to get a new policy passed with the likelihood it will actually
be enacted by Congress. To overcome these challenges, we argue
presidents build their agendas around reliable legislative opportunities
(Edwards 2009) created by Congress’s internal lawmaking calendar and
the level of public demand for action in a policy area. Their focus on
specific legislative opportunities ensures their requests will receive con-
sideration while providing presidents additional bargaining advantages
over Congress.
To test our theory of legislative opportunities, we examine presi-
dential policy requests in 12 prominent issue areas from 1981 through
2008. We also consider two alternative hypotheses—that fulfilling
campaign promises and presidential capital dictates policy priorities. The
promise-keeping hypothesis claims presidents build their programs
around the pledges they made on the campaign trail. The presidential-
capital hypothesis proposes presidents expand their programs when they
are more popular, win a large electoral victory, or face a favorable
Congress. The findings confirm our hypotheses: expiring laws and issue
salience help determine when presidents focus their attention on a policy
area. Additionally, we find some evidence presidents emphasize cam-
paign promises in their legislative agendas, but presidential capital
does not significantly affect the content of the program. These results
indicate why presidential programs remain generally consistent in
their size and scope even as factors such as Congress’s composition
and presidential approval vary over time. Presidents act strategically
by focusing on legislation that Congress is likely to consider anyway,
establishing their position at the outset of legislative bargaining. In
this sense, the president can be described as a pragmatic opportunist
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who responds to exogenous factors when deciding what policies on
which to focus his attention.
Common Accounts of the President’s Program
When exploring the president’s agenda, political scientists have
largely focused on the success presidents have in passing their priority
issues through Congress. Researchers generally examine how successful
presidents are at securing votes (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards
1989; Fleisher, Bond, and Wood 2007) and the myriad activities they
engage in while negotiating with Congress (Beckman 2010; Cameron
2000; Canes-Wrone 2006; Dickinson 2008; Kernell 2007; Neustadt
1960). While this work suggests successful executive leadership is
mainly conditional on Congress’s composition, scholars also find presi-
dents can gain bargaining advantages by proposing policy ideas. Most
notably, presidents can elevate an issue to the legislative agenda. Besides
being uniquely situated to gain congressional attention (Kingdon 1984),
Light asserts the president’s program more broadly “set[s] the tone and
direction of national policymaking” (1982, 1). Peterson (1990) finds that
about 70% of presidential proposals receive congressional consideration.
Early game lobbying (Beckmann 2010) and “going public” on popular
issues (Canes-Wrone 2006; Kernell 2007) are two strategies that can help
move final policy outcomes closer to the president’s preferred position.
Finally, the content of the president’s program also dictates Congress’s
level of partisanship when it considers those issues. Presidential
proposals generate more partisan outcomes than bills written within
Congress and can politicize an issue even when there has been bipartisan
support in the past (Lee 2009).
All of this begs the question: which issues are presidents prioritiz-
ing to begin with? Indeed, Cameron and Park note that the president’s
program has not been analyzed in a way that can answer the question
“what do presidents choose for their legislative programs” (2007, 50)?
We presume presidents do not wish to waste time or capital on issues
with little to no chance of clearing congressional hurdles, but we lack an
adequate answer to why presidents include certain issues in their
program and not others. This is due, in part, to how scholars tend to
study the program. Early work on the president’s agenda was limited to
case studies or post hoc reflections by key personnel or former presidents
that highlighted important legislative battles (Mayhew 2011; Neustadt
1955). However, these studies offer an unsystematic set of reasons an
administration chose to include an issue in the president’s agenda (Bond
and Fleisher 1990).
365Presidents Selecting Their Agendas
Amajor step in understanding the program occurred when political
scientists systematically documented administration priorities based on
interviews with key personnel and presidents (Light 1982; Peterson
1990). Rudalevige (2002) furthered this research by recording every
unique presidential request made in a given year, but his research
focused on internal administration politics rather than external lawmak-
ing priorities. To date, few studies have explored the selection process
presidents use to decide what issues end up on their agendas.
Seizing Legislative Opportunities
In determining which issues are included in the president’s
program, we adopt three assumptions. First, the president has an unob-
servable “preferred agenda” that consists of all the policies he desires
Congress to enact. These latent policy preferences make the program
difficult to study, as we cannot account for issues that could materialize
on the agenda but never take shape (Cohen 2012). Second, we assume
the president proposes policies with the goal of having them enacted.
While presidents may be strategic in selecting issues, when they do focus
on an issue, they do so sincerely. Third, presidents gain utility when their
desired policies are passed. This can occur for many reasons, such as a
boost to the president’s reelection chances, improving his historical legacy
or satisfying the goal of passing good public policy. Consequently, we
assume policy accomplishments are a net positive for the administration
(Light 1982). Accordingly, the president’s utility function from his agenda
being passed can be expressed as:
EUðSuccessful PolicyiÞ5PolicyUtilityi PrðPassageiÞ;
where the expected utility from passing policy i is a function of the over-
all utility the president would gain from bill i and the probability it will
pass Congress. The president’s main legislative goal is to maximize his
expected utility by getting as much of his program enacted as possible.
Unfortunately, this stylized equation is not directly estimable.
While we have numerous variables that capture the probability a bill will
pass, we cannot directly measure the policy utility the president gains
from each issue on his preferred agenda. Instead, we must use observed
policy proposals to distill the White House’s calculus when deciding
what issues to prioritize. Even so, this stylization yields a number of
important insights. First, it narrows the policies we would expect the
president to propose. Issues that provide little utility or have no chance
of passing will be omitted from the program. Additionally, the only way
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the president can increase his expected utility for a given policy is to
increase its probability of passage. Conventional wisdom suggests presi-
dents attempt to alter this probability by utilizing various tools at their
disposal (e.g., the bully pulpit or negotiating skill). In this view, the
White House selects an issue to pursue and using a variety of tactics,
attempts to secure the policy’s passage through Congress. Cohen (2012)
provides a more nuanced version of this theory, arguing presidents
condition their behavior based on Congress’s composition. Instead of
picking any issue, administrations focus on policies they know fall
outside the gridlock interval (Krehbiel 1998) in order to maximize the
chance their proposal will pass. Eshbaugh-Soha (2005) similarly argues
presidents choose their agendas by anticipating various political and
fiscal constraints. Based on who controls Congress and the deficit’s size,
presidents decide how important and long lasting to make their various
proposals.
Even with all these political considerations, presidential programs
remain relatively large in their size and scope. From 1948 through 2008,
the smallest program in a given Congress contained over 140 proposals
on 20 major issue areas. Most agendas include a few hundred proposals,
with the exception of Johnson’s program during the Great Society that
had between 600 and 700. Moreover, small programs are not the norm.
Presidents only sent fewer than 200 proposals to four Congresses. This
suggests presidents present Congress scores of policy ideas regardless of
how difficult lawmaking conditions are at the time, which mirrors
Beckmann’s (2010) and Peterson’s (1990) findings that presidents do
not simply lay dormant when facing an opposition Congress.
This persistence in offering proposals indicates presidents system-
atically respond to other, nonpolitical factors when building their
agendas. We argue presidential programs are relatively consistent in their
size and scope because the president focuses on exogenous factors that
make certain policies priorities for Congress. Leveraging knowledge about
Congress’s internal lawmaking calendar and the public’s policymaking
expectations, administrations can better forecast when a proposal has
a high probability of passing.
By utilizing this approach, administrations affect the broader
legislative agenda in two ways. First, they can potentially get out ahead
of Congress by proposing policy on issues that will return to an unpalat-
able reversion point if left untended. In these situations, acting first is
advantageous as the proposing actor is able to exert significant influence
and move policy closer to their preferred outcome (Beckmann 2010;
Krehbiel 1998). Second, presidents can place new issues on the agenda
by responding to public demand for policy change. Although they
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have different effects on Congress, the underlying mechanism, that
presidents strategically react to outside factors that increase a policy’s
probability of passage, is the same. Specifically, we argue administra-
tions use two factors to determine when an issue moves from within to
outside the gridlock interval, namely: legislative reauthorizations and
policy salience.
Legislative Reauthorizations
Expiring programs create predictable legislative opportunities as
reauthorizations make up a sizeable portion of the congressional agenda
(Hall 2004). These policy matters serve as a baseline lawmaking activity
that takes precedence over other discretionary bills (Adler andWilkerson
2012; Kingdon 1984; Walker 1977). Building a program around
Congress’s preordained priorities increases the likelihood there is legisla-
tive agenda space for proposals that are part of the president’s agenda.
Reauthorizations provide presidents a strong bargaining position, as they
can offer their own bill on such issues and engage in early-game negotiat-
ing strategies that help move policy towards their ideal points (Beckmann
2010). Additionally, building one’s program around “must do”
legislation is an easy way to increase the likelihood of presidential
policy success and thereby to inflate a legislative “batting average”
(Light 1982).
Adler and Wilkerson (2012) demonstrate that expiring legislation
comes in all shapes and sizes. More likely than not, presidents are going
to focus their legislative efforts on large, high-profile expiring statutes—
the farm bill, the highway bill, the Higher Education Act, etc.—that are
often full of dozens of statutory expirations. The development and
growth of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) facilitated
presidential attention to expiring programs. For at least the past three
decades, OMB specifically asks agencies to report which programs are
set to expire in the upcoming year (see OMB Circular A-19). Thus,
presidents have an extensive list from which they can select specific
reauthorizations to include in their legislative agendas.
Additionally, other scholars have argued presidents not only track
upcoming reauthorizations but explicitly wait until an expiring program
requires legislative action to propose a new policy. Hall (2004) notes
that President Bush waited until Head Start expired in 2003 to propose a
reform package rather than include it in the No Child Left Behind Act in
2001. In the spring of 2012, President Obama gave speeches regarding
student loan rates legislation on numerous college campuses just prior to
its July 1, 2012 expiration (Gardner 2012).
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Focusing on expiring provisions could be interpreted as presidents
not acting strategically but simply engaging in routine, administrative
duties by reminding Congress to act on a certain issue. However,
presidents do not include every reauthorization, big or small, on their
agendas. Instead, they only elevate some expirations to their programs,
which suggests doing so is a strategic action, and not an administrative
obligation.2 Thus, we hypothesize:
H1: When an issue domain requires congressional reauthorization,
presidents send more legislative requests on that issue.
Salient Issues
Responding to salient issues provides the president a second factor
around which to build his agenda. Unlike reauthorizations, changes in
immediate public concern, largely driven by exogenous events (Hill
1998), are difficult to predict. This gives the unitary president a distinct
advantage over a diffuse, bicameral legislature. Congress’s discretionary
agenda largely is determined by pressing and highly salient events in
society (Adler andWilkerson 2012; Kingdon 1984). Once issues become
highly salient, the legislature has strong incentives to act but is unlikely
to have a bill to debate, much less pass. When this occurs, presidents
are motivated to proffer their own bill before Congress in order to push
outcomes closer to their preferred outcome (Cameron and Park 2007).
Numerous cases suggest presidents rely on issue salience when
determining their legislative agendas. For instance, during President
Clinton’s first term, crime became a major issue of public concern. In
1993, only 9% of Americans named crime as the country’s most impor-
tant problem. After firearm homicide rates peaked in 1994, 28% rated
crime as the country’s most pressing problem (Cohn et al. 2013). Clinton
responded by making crime a focal point of his program, and later that
year Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act. Similarly, President Bush highlighted counterterrorism policy after
9/11, and President Obama proposed financial regulations in 2009
during the Great Recession.
Conversely, it could be argued that the president causes a policy
area’s salience to increase by including that issue in his program. We
believe this process does not explain shifts in public concern. Consistent
empirical findings suggest that while presidential proposals can have a
small effect in raising issue salience in the short term, their influence on
the public’s consciousness is fleeting (Cohen 1995, 1997).
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This is not to say presidents cannot generate public support for
specific proposals. Canes-Wrone (2006) finds when presidents go public
on popular issues they can increase citizens’ attention towards that issue,
although Edwards (2003) argues this influence is marginal. Regardless,
this mechanism likely does not apply broadly to the program as presi-
dents do not always announce their agenda publicly. Rather, many
proposals are sent to Congress in messages or letters and surely vary in
their level of salience. For this reason, we believe presidents’ programs
respond to and, in general, do not change public concern.
To examine this possible relationship, we conducted Granger
causality tests between the inclusion of issues in the presidential program
and issue area salience. The intuition behind this method is straightfor-
ward: When examining two variables, X and Z, we are interested in
determining if X explains Z, Z explains X, or if they are endogenous
(they explain each other). To test these possibilities, we regress X on the
lagged values of X and Z (and do the same for Z). If X is explained by
Z’s lagged values, but Z is not predicted by X’s lags, we have evidence
there is a significant relationship in which Z leads to a change in X and
not the other way around (Thurman and Fisher 1988).
Accordingly, we examined the relationship between presidential
proposals and issue salience. We coded each presidential proposal from
1981 through 2008 using the Policy Agendas Project (PAP) major topic
codes,3 aggregated each topic’s proposals by quarter, and matched them
with the corresponding “Most Important Problem” survey that measures
issue salience. This created 19 panels each spanning 112 quarters. To
test the relationship between these variables, we measured the effects
from two Granger causality equations, formally expressed as:
Proposalt5l1
XL
i51
aiProposalt211
XL
i51
biSaliencet211et (1)
and
Saliencet5l1
XL
i51
aiSaliencet211
XL
i51
biProposalt211et (2)
Since the dependent variable in Equation (1) is a count of presiden-
tial proposals, we estimated the first model using a fixed-effects negative
binomial model. Equation (2) was estimated using a fixed-effects
regression model, and we include up to three lags in each model.4 We
report the results of the Granger causality test in Table 1.
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The results provide support for our claim that changes in issue
salience lead to presidential proposals and not vice versa. We consis-
tently find presidents respond to increases in public concern in the
previous quarter by offering more policy ideas on that same issue in the
subsequent three months. On the other hand, the number of presidential
proposals in previous quarters has no effect on issue salience. Thus, since
presidents respond to issue salience, rather than create it, we propose:
H2: As the salience of an issue area increases, presidents send
more legislative requests in that policy area.
Alternatives Explanations
Although few studies have explicitly focused on issue attention in
presidents’ programs, related research argues chief executives respond to
a different set of factors when constructing their agendas, specifically
campaign promises and presidential capital.
Promise Keeping
Presidents may build their programs around campaign promises
they made during the election. Campaign issues could arise for a variety
of reasons—personal priorities of the candidate, areas of emphasis to
help copartisans get elected, etc.—but regardless they will take a certain
level of precedence in the program as those issues will serve as an
TABLE 1
Presidential Proposal and Issue Salience Granger Causality Tests
(standard errors in parentheses)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Part 1: Does issue salience predict presidential proposals?
Salience Lag 1 1.10 (0.364)* 1.82 (1.08)* 1.84 (1.10)*
Salience Lag 2 20.704 (1.10) 21.40 (1.46)
Salience Lag 3 0.615 (1.11)
Part 2: Do presidential proposals predict issue salience?
Proposals Lag 1 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Proposals Lag 2 20.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Proposals Lag 3 20.001 (0.001)
*p< 0.05.
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explicit yardstick by which to gauge the president’s success in following
through on perceived mandates (Conley 2001). Previous studies indicate
some campaign pledges are included on the president’s agenda. Fishel
(1985) finds newly elected chief executives emphasize major electoral
promises in their programs but sometimes must abandon key portions of
their platforms due to unfavorable governing conditions. Similarly,
Shaw’s (1998) analysis of Clinton’s 1992 campaign pledges and
subsequent performance in office suggests presidents try to fulfill their
policy promises. These findings conform to similar research on congres-
sional representation (Sulkin 2005). This suggests campaign issues are a
prominent consideration when elected officials decide which issues to
focus their attention and resources toward.
Presidential Capital
Scholars have consistently found that Congress passes more
administration proposals as presidential “capital” increases (Barrett and
Eshbaugh-Soha 2007; Rivers and Rose 1985). This concept consists of
three factors: congressional composition, presidential approval, and the
president’s electoral mandate (Light 1982, 26). Congressional composi-
tion is considered the factor that most affects presidential agendas.
Political scientists have argued presidents are more successful at
getting their programs passed during unified government, when more
copartisans are in Congress, and if the gridlock interval is small (Bond
and Fleisher 1990; Brady and Volden 2006; Edwards 1989; Krehbiel
1998). Additionally, studies indicate presidents shape the program based
on these same factors (Cameron and Park 2007; Cohen 2012).
Importantly, this work focuses on the program’s relative size, not
issue prioritization. Since policy windows, independent of congressional
partisanship, incentivize presidents to propose bills, we should still
observe numerous requests even as polarization increases. Although
gridlock may censor some requests, it likely does not prevent administra-
tions from responding to expiring bills or salient issues. Thus, while
legislative composition affects the overall size of the program, its role in
dictating issue attention in the agenda is likely marginal.
Controls
Presidential Timing
Scholars commonly note the president’s ability to bargain with
Congress is enhanced or diminished at various periods during his term in
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office. Honeymoons, “the early period of grace and good temper” (Light
1982, 45), are commonly viewed as a moment in which presidents can
win legislative victories (Beckmann and Godfrey 2007). Studies of
presidential bargaining suggest most legislative requests are made early
in the term, and in later years, the administration focuses on whatever
did not pass during the honeymoon (Mayhew 2011; Peterson 1990).
This argument follows from a mandate theory of presidential programs,
in which administrations send most of their agenda immediately to
Congress (Dahl 1990; Edwards 1989).
Recent work suggests presidents expand their programs during
reelection years (Cohen 2012). Administrations may propose more
policy ideas (1) as a signal of competence, (2) as an attempt (sometimes)
to fulfill unmet campaign promises among key constituencies (Light 1982),
or (3) to highlight key differences with the opposition party under
divided government (Cohen 2012). Finally, presidents are less
legislatively active and successful in the final year of their terms
because of minimum bargaining influence with Congress (Barrett and
Eshbaugh-Soha 2007) and a shift to building a historical legacy
through non-legislative means (Light 1982).
Issue Divisiveness
Contentiousness associated with a given policy may affect the
likelihood the White House will focus on it. Some issues generate more
partisan controversy than others, which affect the probability a given
policy change will be enacted (Binder 2003; Maltzman and Shipan
2008). Since presidents seek to pass as much of their programs as possi-
ble, they may avoid focusing on divisive policies and instead emphasize
less contentious programs in their legislative agendas.
Exogenous Conditions
Objective conditions, such as unemployment or wars, are proposed
as a factor that influences what issues presidents include in their agendas
(Cohen 2012, 1995; Peterson 1990). Cohen (2012) utilizes six variables
(government outlays, size of deficit, interest rates, inflation, war, and
recession). These factors, as well as countless others such as violent
crime rates, gas prices, consumer confidence, etc. are interrelated, and
different combinations may affect policy areas in complex ways.
Without a cogent theory for including some but not others, we
utilize two exogenous conditions, government outlays as a percentage of
GDP and change in GDP per capita, as control variables. Government
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outlays, as a percentage of GDP, measures the relative size of govern-
ment. As this variable increases, there are more policies for presidents to
prioritize in their programs, which could lead to an increase in legislative
requests.5 Change in GDP per capita measures the economy’s relative
strength. As the economy weakens, presidents will concentrate their
legislative efforts in economically related issue areas or will alternatively
broaden their legislative program when the economy is showing signs of
strength.6
Data and Measures
Dependent Variable
To measure the president’s program, we use Rudalevige’s (2002)
dataset constructed from the Public Papers of the President.7 Each data
point is a unique legislative proposal made by the president during that
year. Multiple proposals in the same year are not recorded, meaning we
do not measure issues that are repeatedly emphasized by the administra-
tion. Using the Policy Agendas Project (PAP) codebook, we coded
every proposal from 1981 through 2008 by major policy topic and com-
piled all presidential proposals in 12 main policy areas: macroeconomy,
labor, defense, law and order, healthcare, social welfare, rights, trade,
education, environment, international affairs, and government spending.8
We limit our analysis to these 12 areas for two reasons. First, these
issues include 80% of presidents’ programs and represent the most active
policy domains during this time period. Although we are not certain that
our results are generalizable across all issues, we have no theoretical
reason to believe other policy areas would be subject to systematically
different considerations. Second, we limit our analysis to issue areas in
which we can accurately gauge issue salience.
Our dependent variable is a count of the number of unique legisla-
tive requests, by policy area, made in a given year. During the 28 years
we examine, this amounts to 2,785, out of 3,484 total (80%), unique
proposals. As Table 2 shows, there is large variability between policy
areas as well as across time for each issue.9
Additionally, the program’s size fluctuates between years (from a
minimum of 50 in 1985 to a maximum of 225 in 1999), but importantly
no single issue dominates any president’s agenda in a given year.10 To
provide a sense of how many proposals by policy area are included in
the program on an annual basis, Table 3 lists the average number of
proposals, by issue, sent by the president to Congress in a year.
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Notably, while each administration’s legislative agenda con-
tains a few hundred proposals annually, the program is relatively
diffuse when disaggregated by policy area. Thus, slightly more or
fewer policy ideas about an issue can constitute a large change in
the program’s focus.
TABLE 2
Number of Policy Proposals Across Presidencies
Reagan GHW Bush Clinton GW Bush
Macroeconomy 39 16 47 41
Rights 48 5 25 17
Healthcare 43 12 148 79
Labor 27 13 125 50
Education 32 25 121 42
Environment 19 35 31 32
Law and Order 41 66 166 49
Social Welfare 21 14 57 33
Defense 58 20 66 98
Trade 65 9 66 41
Foreign Policy 114 82 232 162
Government Spending 72 48 99 34
Total 579 345 1183 678
Overall Total 809 423 1373 876
TABLE 3
Average Annual Number of Presidential Proposals by Issue Area,
1981–2008
Issue Area Average Number
Macroeconomy 5.07
Rights 3.36
Healthcare 10.14
Labor 7.68
Education 7.86
Environment 3.79
Law and Order 11.36
Social Welfare 4.46
Defense 7.43
Trade 2.64
Foreign Policy 8.07
Government Spending 8.93
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Independent Variables
To determine whether reliable legislative opportunities influence
presidential program development, we used the following measures.
First, we measured Expirations by counting the number of authorized
programs set to expire in laws that were discussed in the main chapters
of the annual Congressional Quarterly Almanac each legislative session.
Each identified statute was initially coded by PAP topic area, and every
subsequent expiring provision therein was also coded into the same topic
area. Since our focus is on expiring authorizations, we limited our atten-
tion to authorizing legislation and excluded appropriations bills, which
rarely include novel expiration language that is not also referenced in a
concomitant authorization bill (Adler andWilkerson 2012).11
Second, to summarize Issue Salience, we followed standard practice
by using Gallup’s Most Important Problem polling data to capture
issues of public concern (Canes-Wrone 2006; Cohen 1995). Using
the PAP method for aggregating these open-ended poll questions, we
coded and then averaged the percentage of the public who listed a pol-
icy area as the most important problem in a given year. Our empirical
analysis tests whether issue salience affects the number of presidential
proposals offered in the same year.
To assess the promise-keeping hypothesis, we measure Campaign
Promises by calculating the number of words the president devoted to a
given policy area compared to all policy discussion in his nominating
convention speech.12 This ratio assesses how much emphasis he deliber-
ately assigned to an issue in a situation with significant time constraints.
To test the presidential timing and capital-alternative hypothesis, we
included dummy variables for presidentialHoneymoons (the first year of
the first term), Reelection Year (the last year in a first term), and Lame
Ducks (any legislative session occurring after the November elections).
We used Gallup polls, averaged by year, to measure Presidential
Approval. Additionally, we measured a president’s Electoral Margin by
calculating the difference between the number of electoral votes the win-
ning candidate received from that which the other major party candidate
received.13 Finally, we measured Congressional Composition three
different ways: (1) a dummy variable for years of divided government,
(2) the proportion of presidential copartisans in Congress that year, and
(3) using Chiou and Rothenberg’s (2003) methodology, we computed
four variations of the gridlock interval.
Finally, following from previous research that variously found
policy-specific conflict can heighten the likelihood of legislative activity
(Adler and Wilkerson 2012; Maltzman and Shipan 2008), reduce it
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(MacDonald 2007), or have mixed effects (Binder 2003), we control
for Issue Divisiveness. Specifically, we calculated the percentage of
party-unity votes in the House and the Senate for each policy area in
the previous year. Since either chamber can act as a choke point to
lawmaking, we included the value for whichever chamber had a higher
percentage of party-unity votes.
Analysis
Since our data are time-series cross-sectional counts of presidential
legislative requests, we estimated our results using a panel negative
binomial model with fixed effects.14 With 12 different policy areas
measured across 28 years, our N 5 336. To test our hypotheses, we
specify a baseline model that includes expirations, salience, government
outlays, change in GDP, and the presidential timing variables.15 Our
legislative opportunity theory garners initial support in the baseline
model shown in Table 4.
As predicted, expirations and salience are both positive and signifi-
cant. Additionally, the coefficient magnitudes reflect our expectations
concerning how many proposals each item generates. The results of
the legislative opportunity variables are consistent across all model
specifications that follow, which lend strong support to their robustness
as factors explaining what policy issues the president will pursue in
Congress.16
Since large expiring laws tend to include hundreds of individual
sunsets, we argued presidents prioritize statutes with sizable numbers of
expirations and largely ignore laws with small numbers of expiring pro-
visions. An increase of 12 expiring provisions (a one standard deviation
change) leads the president to increase the number of policy proposals in
that policy area by 8%. As Figure 1 illustrates, the president will increase
the number of policy proposals he issues in a given policy area by 78%
(an increase of more than two unique policy proposals) when that policy
area has 91 expiring provisions, the maximum observed value in these
data. While the actual effect sizes are relatively small, the nature of the
effect is significant considering our count is of unique proposals and not
repeated advocacy of any given proposal in the program. This finding
reflects our expectations and conforms to similar results elsewhere
(Adler and Wilkerson 2012). When the president sees government
funding at stake in bills that have a high probability of passage, he
consistently increases his effort to influence the process and legislative
outcomes.
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The impact of issue salience on policy emphasis is much larger
by comparison. The magnitude of issue salience reflects presidential
motivation to propose bills as citizen concern increases. Our results are
in line with Cameron and Park’s (2007) burden-sharing model and
reflect a consistent finding in the American politics literature that sug-
gests a type of responsiveness to public opinion (see Burstein 2014 for a
review; Page and Shapiro 1983). Citizen concern places pressure on
both the White House and Congress simultaneously, thus increasing the
probability of action. While expirations represent punctuating events
within government, public pressure is likely a forceful influence on the
president with immediate consequences for electoral gains or political
capital. This relationship is evident in Figure 2, which shows increases
in issue salience can lead to presidents, on average, nearly tripling
the number of proposals they send to Congress in that policy area. In
addition, traditional factors thought to influence presidential behavior,
such as the timing factors included in these models, do not diminish the
influences we discuss throughout this article.
Promise Keeping
In addition to the factors identified as having an effect on the
probable success of a bill—the number of provisions set to expire and
FIGURE 1
Expiring Provisions and the Presidential Program
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the relative public salience of the issue—campaign promises may signifi-
cantly influence what issues presidents tend to emphasize in their
programs. Table 5 shows that, in addition to our legislative opportunities
variables, issues the president emphasizes on the campaign trail also
significantly increase the number of policy proposals the president
transmits to Congress.
As shown in Figure 3, the president increases the number of policy
proposals he transmits to Congress by about 48% when he also empha-
sized the same policy issue at the highest observed level during the
campaign. However, it is important to note that this finding is not robust
when including issue divisiveness and in models controlling for other
important dimensions of presidential influence. None of the other factors
included in the baseline model in Table 4—budget outlays, change in
GDP, and issue divisiveness—move the president to act in a significant
manner when controlling for campaign issue emphasis.. Both legislative
opportunities variables are still positive and significant. While the effect
of expiring provisions on the number of policy proposals the president
transmits to Congress is identical to the effect in the baseline model, the
effect of salience is slightly smaller. In this model that includes both
legislative opportunity and promise-keeping variables, issue salience
leads the president to nearly double the number of policy proposals
transmitted to Congress.
FIGURE 2
Issue Salience and the Presidential Program
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TABLE 5
Promise Keeping1Legislative Opportunities Model
(standard errors in parentheses)
Variable Coefficient
Expirations 0.006 (0.003)**
Salience 1.196 (0.480)**
Outlays 20.045 (0.026)*
DGDP 0.005 (0.024)
Honeymoon 0.100 (0.101)
Reelection 20.004 (0.120)
Lame Duck 20.132 (0.123)
Campaign Issue Emphasis 1.542 (0.829)*
Issue Divisiveness 0.076 (0.212)
Constant 22.993 (0.597)***
N 336
Wald v2 34.15***
*p< 0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01.
FIGURE 3
Campaign Issue Emphasis and the Presidential Program
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Presidential Capital
We put the legislative opportunity theory to a more rigorous test
by estimating additional models including factors related to presidential
capital. Table 6 reports several analyses that include our baseline model
with variables that capture presidential capital theory and a final model
that includes the five main capital variables: presidential approval, the
president’s electoral margin of victory, divided government, congres-
sional composition, and gridlock. If presidential capital, not other
legislative opportunities, predicts presidential issue prioritization, these
new variables should be significant while expirations and salience will
lose their explanatory power. However, as the results in Table 6 show,
this is not the case.
Again, the results support the legislative opportunity theory. Expi-
rations and salience are positive and significant in every specification.
Much like the promise-keeping models, the magnitude of the effect of
these two variables is nearly identical to the baseline-only model. In
contrast, presidential approval and electoral margin have no consistent
substantive effect. Notably, each measure of legislative composition
yields a null result.17 Two main inferences derive from these findings.
First, the factors that predict presidential success on roll-call votes do not
explain issue prioritization in the program. Second, hostile Congresses do
not simply constrain the policies on which the presidents ask Congress to
act. Instead, these agendas and their eventual success suggest a complex
relationship between proposing and bargaining as different lawmaking
opportunities may offer better prospects for certain requests than others.
In many ways, the strength of our approach is the robustness of the
findings and the ability of these explanations to hold up in the face of the
canonical explanations of presidential influence. In Table 7, we combine
factors related to promise keeping, presidential capital, and timing along
with the opportunity theory variables. The analysis demonstrates that
factors related to strategic opportunities consistently continue to explain
variation in the number of policy proposals a president makes. Issue
salience and the presence of expiring provisions both predict an increase
in presidential policy proposals in that issue area. No other variables in
the model, related to campaign promises, timing, or capital significantly
predict presidential issuance of policy proposals to Congress.
Discussion and Conclusion
The policy program is commonly viewed as a tool of presidential
administrations to gain attention from Congress and open new policy
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windows. While recent studies of the program have emphasized the
role partisan alignment between the branches plays in decreasing the
agenda’s size (particularly divided government), basic questions about
issue priorities have been overlooked. We considered why some issues,
and not others, are included in the president’s program. This approach
has allowed us to highlight patterns in presidential administrations
rather than idiosyncrasies of the individual president. Our findings, that
presidents respond to reliable legislative opportunities to maximize
their proposals’ chances of being enacted, help explain the seemingly
disjointed agendas the White House sometimes adopts. In addition, we
find evidence that presidents are mindful of promises made on the
campaign trail and emphasize these issues in their legislative agendas.
Common complaints that presidents do not focus on ideological agen-
das can be understood as a strategic choice. Presidents are constrained
by a set of independent factors that influence when policy makers in
Washington will focus on a particular issue.
From an agenda-setting perspective, these findings suggest the
concept of presidential influence needs additional refining. Conceived
TABLE 7
Legislative Opportunities1All Alternative Hypotheses and
Controls Model
(standard errors in parentheses)
Variable Coefficient
Expirations 0.006 (0.003)*
Salience 1.192 (0.522)**
Outlays 20.029 (0.070)
DGDP 0.013 (0.034)
Honeymoon 0.075 (0.114)
Reelection 20.045 (0.151)
Lame Duck 20.125 (0.171)
Campaign Issue Emphasis 0.613 (1.009)
Presidential Approval 20.005 (0.007)
Electoral Margin 20.000 (0.001)
Divided Government 0.126 (0.205)
Congressional Composition 0.755 (1.631)
Gridlock 0.076 (2.605)
Issue Divisiveness 0.013 (0.234)
Constant 23.508 (1.835)*
N 336
Wald v2 22.97*
*p< 0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01.
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principally as a method through which administrations open lawmaking
windows for their policies, our results indicate the presidential program
is also built in response to other exogenous factors. Many times, presidents
choose to focus on policies that will soon be debated in Congress or are
salient to the public. In doing so, presidents can leverage them in an
attempt to increase the likelihood their proposal is enacted. Additionally,
presidential attention to factors like policy expirations and salience offers
important texture to the role of legislative composition in explaining
lawmaking. In this view, presidents are constrained from proposing new
policies by the array of preferences present in Congress. While true, the
more interesting result is that presidents attempt to leverage reversion
points created by expirations and public demand for policy to enact impor-
tant items on their agenda.
Based on these results, three future avenues of research can expand
our understanding of the president’s program. First, our data catalogue
the composition of the president’s program but not the dynamics of pres-
idential emphasis on certain issues in bargaining with Congress. Though
encouraged by the robustness of our findings when compared to prevail-
ing theories of presidential influence in the legislative arena, we believe
the magnitude of the effects observed are artificially low because presi-
dential emphasis is not considered.
Second, we treat proposals as independent from one another.
However, emphasizing one issue may have a crowding out effect on
others—meaning issue areas compete for presidential attention. Policy
competition remains an elusive but important topic that warrants more
attention. Finally, our analysis does not consider whether individual
policy requests are relatively extreme or moderate. Cohen (2012) finds
presidents send centrist proposals during divided government, but this
may be conditional on which factor has created the policy window.
Examining whether issue salience generates more ideological proposals
than expirations could explain why presidents sometimes take a hard-
line approach with Congress.
Our study provides a new perspective on presidential legislative
activism. It offers evidence that presidents act strategically when propos-
ing their agenda, but in a way different than has been previously noted.
By adhering to independently created legislative opportunities, adminis-
trations choose to constrain themselves in order to maximize their
agenda’s impact. The result is a more nuanced understanding of the
president’s role in the lawmaking process. Rather than being endowed
with a privileged, first-mover position, presidents cultivate that role by
molding their program around specific issues. In short, the president is
not dominant in the agenda-setting process, but strategic.
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NOTES
For helpful comments we thank Brian Hallett, Molly Reynolds, Chuck Shipan,
seminar participants at the University of Michigan and the University of Colorado
Boulder, and three anonymous referees. Additional thanks to Heather Larsen-Price and
Andy Rudalevige for generously sharing their data and providing useful guidance. We
are responsible for all remaining errors.
1. In this article, we use the terms “president’s agenda” and “president’s
program” interchangeably.
2. This assertion was confirmed in a private conversation one of the authors had
with Matt Vaeth, a Director of the Legislative Reference Division of OMB during the
Obama presidency. Vaeth stated that the president frequently chooses agenda items from
the list of large reauthorizations up for consideration in the coming year.
3. These presidential proposal data were collected using Rudalevige’s (2002)
method, which is further explained in the data section of this article.
4. This is for two reasons. First, changes in the number of presidential proposals
or the level of issue salience seem unlikely to occur nine months after a given event
occurs. Second, presidential proposals mentioned one year apart are spuriously correlated
based on seasonal factors. For instance, more proposals are sent in January and February
because of the State of the Union and budget message while fewer are observed in the
summer when Congress is not in session.
5. Unfortunately, the OMB coding scheme used to classify each program’s
outlays cannot be mapped onto the Policy Agendas Project coding in a meaningful way.
6. We tested for potential variation in program due to presidential specific effects
by including president-centered dummies in each model. The president-centered
variables were never significant, nor did they impact the models, so they were not
included in the final analyses.
7. Rudalevige’s data end at 1996. The data for 1997–2008 were collected repli-
cating and extending the methodology outlined by Rudalevige (2002, 67–72). These
data reflect specific legislative requests included in the Public Papers of the President,
not full draft bills, which have been used in other studies (Light 1982).
8. Our analysis is at the major topic level because none of the other variables can
be parsed from the major topic to the subtopic level. Many reauthorizations cover multi-
ple subtopics, and most issue salience polls identify major topic issues. Additionally,
other work on presidential issue attention uses major topic codes (e.g., Larsen-Price
2012).
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9. We do not include treaties and international agreements.
10. No issue area makes up more than 21% of the program in a single year.
11. The number of expirations in our data set ranges from 0 to 72 in a policy area
for a given year.
12. Convention acceptance speeches are commonly used to measure presidential
and partisan priorities (see Gerring 1998; Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen 2003). To
develop this measure, we counted words in the convention speech at the first mention of
any policy issue. This excluded the various “thank you’s” and stories at the beginning
and end of each speech. The denominator for this ratio is the total number of policy
words in the speech. Using the PAP codebook, we coded the number of words the
president devoted to a policy area. We excluded instances in which an incumbent presi-
dent mentioned what he did in his previous term or a candidate attacked their opponent
without offering their alternative plan. Thus, the sum of coded policy words does not
equal the total number of policy words in the convention speech.
13. We did test other potential measures to capture the size of the electoral
margin, including difference in percent popular vote received by the two major-party
candidates, overall electoral votes received, and percent popular vote received by the
winner. All these measures highly correlate and do not change our models’ results.
14. We tested each variable to ensure it was stationary. Only GDP required differ-
encing, creating our DGDP control variable. The results of Hausman specification test
for the appropriateness of fixed effects were all significant indicating a need to use fixed
effects for policy area.
15. We estimated the model using a variety of different control variables includ-
ing war, unemployment, and size of the deficit. None substantively changed the findings.
16. As a robustness check, we also estimated the baseline model when ordering
the data by major policy area and congressional term (instead of year). The findings
of the baseline model when ordering the data by congressional term are nearly identical
to those obtained when ordered by year. We employ year as our time unit because
reducing the time dimension to congressional terms dramatically decreases the number
of observations and induces a serious concern about biased estimates. Moreover, there is
ample scholarly evidence supporting the use of year when evaluating legislative agendas
as they can fluctuate within a congressional session (e.g., Adler and Wilkerson 2012;
Maltzman and Shipan 2008).
17. We tested different variations of the gridlock interval in the single-variable
model and each measure of legislative composition in the model. None of these combina-
tions changed the substantive results as the covariates associated with our theory were
consistently significant.
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